Live evidence page

The security questionnaire, answered by the record.

Every number here is read from the record itself as this page loads — log admiral/prod — so it states what is true now, not what was true last quarter. Nothing on it asks you to take our word: the last section shows how to check it yourself, offline.

Audit trail
Tamper evidence
Kill switch
Human sign-off
Incident reconstruction
Vendor exit

Read from the record, not from a PDF
Recomputed on every load
Checkable without an account

Coverage score

ⓘ

How much of what this deployment could be recording is actually arriving — capture planes live, agents heard from recently, traces joined, calls priced. It is a configuration measure, not an integrity one: a perfect score on a chain nobody sends events to is still a perfect score. Every deduction is listed below.

41/100

Events on the chain

ⓘ

Actions recorded on this log: model calls, tool calls, decisions, approvals and refusals. Each one carries the hash of the one before it, so the count is also the length of an unbroken chain.

Last external anchor

ⓘ

When the chain head was last countersigned by an independent RFC 3161 timestamp authority. That countersignature is what turns “signed by us” into “existed before this moment”, so the gap since the last one is the window in which a rewrite would not yet be provable.

3h ago

The questionnaire

The rows a reviewer sends, answered from the chain.

AnsweredDo you maintain an audit trail of agent actions?: Yes — 59 events across 6 agent(s), hash-chained in an append-only store. The chain head is at sequence 59.
AnsweredCan the audit trail be altered after the fact?: Any alteration is computable: each event carries the hash of the one before it; 22 of 22 signed checkpoints are countersigned by an independent RFC 3161 timestamp authority, and 21 are additionally held in write-once storage (S3 Object Lock, compliance mode) that not even our cloud account's root user can delete. Editing a stored event breaks verification at that exact sequence.
AnsweredIs there a kill switch, and is its use itself recorded?: Yes — a tenant-level halt that wins over every other rule. Current state: armed, not engaged. Every flip is chained under the operator's name.
AnsweredAre humans in the loop for high-impact actions?: Yes — "Moving more than the threshold requires a named human to approve first." (enforcing). 0 action(s) held for sign-off in this record; every grant or refusal is a chained event naming the reviewer.
AnsweredAre out-of-bounds actions blocked, not just flagged?: Yes — deny-by-default evaluation runs before enforced actions execute; 0 action(s) blocked in this record, each carrying the rule id, version, and reasons.
AnsweredAre adverse decisions about people recorded with reasons?: Yes — "A decision against a person must record why, in structured form." (enforcing). A decision against a person without a structured reason is refused.
AnsweredCan you reconstruct an incident end-to-end?: Yes — events are strictly sequenced, and sessions and trace ids join related actions across capture planes (model, action, effect). Coverage score: 41/100, with its deductions stated below.
AnsweredWhat happens to the evidence if the vendor disappears?: Nothing. The format is open, exports are self-contained, and the verifier runs offline with no account — the record stays independently checkable whether or not Auditant exists.

What we deduct from ourselves

Stated limitations, in our own voice.

A trust page that only says yes is marketing. These are the current deductions from the coverage score, published because an omission a reviewer finds later costs more than one we named first.

capture planes not yet live: edge
newest external anchor is stale — the exposure window is open
3 agents quiet for over 24h — silence and a broken emitter look identical from here
36 of 36 traces observed on a single plane only — assertion, not corroboration
8 events carry cost the upstream did not price

Do not take our word for it

Verify it yourself.

Request the evidence bundle for any window from the operator — a single JSON file carrying the events, the checkpoints, the public keys, and its own verifier. With nothing but Node.js:

The verifier recomputes every hash, re-links the chain, and validates each checkpoint signature and RFC 3161 countersignature. It names the exact sequence number at the first discrepancy.

anyone, anywhere — with nothing but Node

node -e "const b=require('./bundle.json');require('fs').writeFileSync('verify.mjs',b.verifier)"
node verify.mjs ./bundle.json

What this proves, and what it does not

Verification proves the records were not altered after their checkpoint anchored. It cannot prove the log is complete: an action that never reached Auditant is not in it, and no signature can say otherwise. Coverage is answered by deployment configuration — the score above, and its deductions — never by a signature.

That property survives us. The format is open and the verifier needs neither our servers nor our permission.

For your reviewer

Send them this page, not a PDF.

It is read from the record itself as it loads, so it is never a claim about last quarter. Your own tenant gets one at its own address.

Start free See it live

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Nothing is blocked until you say so
Your proof stays yours if you leave